Matthias Andree reports:
The POP3 standard, currently RFC-1939, has specified an optional, MD5-based authentication scheme called "APOP" which no longer should be considered secure.
Additionally, fetchmail's POP3 client implementation has been validating the APOP challenge too lightly and accepted random garbage as a POP3 server's APOP challenge. This made it easier than necessary for man-in-the-middle attackers to retrieve by several probing and guessing the first three characters of the APOP secret, bringing brute forcing the remaining characters well within reach.
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